External Trajectory Data Collection System "Collection"

Determining the trajectory of test launches of carrier rockets and strategic ballistic missiles, such as "Topol-M," "Bulava," and "Albatros," was carried out using the ground-based Command and Measurement Complex (CMC) of the cosmodrome. The CMC included measurement stations (MS) located across the territory of the former USSR.

If special forces are the last argument of kings, then nuclear missile weapons are the last argument of the presidents of superpowers. Their development did not come easily. Delivering a nuclear warhead to enemy territory required the creation of strategic missiles, while the advancement of military space vehicles necessitated the development of carrier rockets.

The development of rocket technology required extensive testing, known as flight experiments. During these tests, the primary objective was to determine the missile's flight trajectory. To achieve this, a large number of tracking and measurement systems of various types were deployed across the former USSR.

The testing was so intensive that the bottleneck became the delivery of trajectory measurement data to the spaceport's Computing Center (CC). This data was crucial for processing and generating flight trajectory reports on the conducted tests.

The data was recorded on hard storage media, such as magnetic tapes and punched tapes, and then transported by aircraft to the spaceport. However, airplanes could no longer guarantee the timely and synchronized delivery of data from all measurement stations.

Defeat in the "Cold War"

During the Soviet era, a massive foundation was laid in the field of weaponry. Today, we see modernized versions of the Tu-160 and Tu-22M3 bombers, the T-90 tank, and more. The emergence of new types of weaponry often stems from long-forgotten Soviet developments, still stored in the classified archives of design bureaus. Soviet engineers produced technological marvels, many of which remain hidden away in the stockpiles of what was once the Motherland. However, not everything was as prosperous everywhere.

Problems arose with the "nervous system of the army"—communications and computing technology. During the era of stagnation, Soviet party leaders strongly opposed cybernetics, especially when it came to industry management, as proposed by Academician Glushkov in the late 1960s. The Communist Party feared losing its influence over society, and its "partners" from abroad helped reinforce these fears. For instance, after returning from a trip to the United States, Academician Arbatov declared that computers were nothing more than a passing trend in the West [1].

In this environment, a critical mistake was made: instead of developing its own line of computers, such as the BESM-6, the Soviet Union focused on copying foreign computer models. These included the well-known IBM-360 and PDP-11, which became the basis for the Soviet "Unified System" (EC) computers, as well as models like the SM-3 and SM-1420. This approach led to the USSR missing a crucial technological shift—the rise of personal computers—resulting in an overproduction of EC and SM computers. One didn’t have to look far for examples: an entire floor of the 7th building of NIIRI was filled with these computers, only to be dismantled a year later due to their obsolescence and uselessness.

In the main building, these monstrous copycat machines were also placed in various locations. At the northern test site in Severodvinsk, a four-story building was constructed to house similar equipment, which was intended for collecting trajectory data on the flight of strategic missiles during test launches from submarines.

At the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, SM-1700 computers—clones of the VAX-11/730—were being implemented.

Until 1991, realizing the need to separate his part from the entire "Collection" system, lead engineer Kozlov developed the architecture of a database that served as a subsystem for storing trajectory information. The storage subsystem was designed following the ideology of a file server, which was to be a standalone computer with a file system storing measurement data files. A directory was provided for file access, allowing interested parties to retrieve trajectory information files by searching based on test dates and product numbers. Additionally, it was possible to obtain reference information about the product, manufacturer, and launch date by performing various queries on reference tables. As early as 1991, the file server utilized the Oracle DBMS, which had been generously provided by Soviet technical intelligence. The operating system was UNIX.

Thus, at that time, the development of the database architecture effectively separated the responsibilities between the development of the storage subsystem and the actual information collection system.

By the new year of 1991, the leadership of NIIRI decided to establish a department based on the best specialists from the CAD and ACS departments. Valentin A. Kozlov was appointed as the head of the department, as he was the only developer who had completed his part at the very beginning of the work on the "Collection" system.

The department head took on the task of selecting personnel to develop unprecedented software for the "Collection" system at that time, as well as conducting incoming quality control of the system's hardware. Additionally, as the future would show, he was also responsible for organizing complex financial schemes that ensured funding for the system’s development during the post-Soviet collapse. On one hand, this scheme was a result of Kozlov’s initiative and was the only viable option at the time; on the other hand, it held personal significance for him.

The department head took on the task of selecting personnel to develop unprecedented software for the "Collection" system at that time, as well as conducting incoming quality control of the system's hardware. Additionally, as the future would show, he was also responsible for organizing complex financial schemes that ensured funding for the system’s development during the post-Soviet collapse. On one hand, this scheme was a result of Kozlov’s initiative and was the only viable option at the time; on the other hand, it held personal significance for him.

The question of how to avoid yet another failure hung over them like the Sword of Damocles. Failures were coming one after another at that time.

Under the windows in the inner courtyard of NIIRI stood original computing machines, designed to simulate a missile launch control system at the request of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the Krylov Military Academy. The cabinets filled with equipment stood abandoned in the rain, unwanted by the military. NIIRI was overflowing with computing hardware, whose only real value was the large amount of precious metals they contained. An attempt to create the "Collection" system using SM-1420 computers (a Soviet copy of the American PDP-11) and adapter racks ended in failure. Nothing worked. Everything was thrown away. The situation resembled Krylov’s famous fable *The Quartet*—there was no comprehensive vision for the future system. Most of the institute’s leadership were radio engineers, but they were not software developers and had no understanding of software architecture. Meanwhile, the specialists who worked on software development for the "Vega" system were overwhelmed with the task of porting software from EC-1045-based computing systems to IBM PC/AT personal computers.

Before 1991, Soviet technical intelligence gathered extensive information on missile testing conducted in the United States. For example, intelligence data was obtained on the testing of the "Trident" sea-based missile using a signals intelligence (SIGINT) vessel. Additionally, intelligence agencies acquired information about the communication lines used at the Vandenberg test range [2], as well as the data transmission speeds employed.

By the late 1980s, the data transmission speed at the test range of the potential adversary was 1,200–2,400 bps. In the Soviet Union, it was concluded that automation of the "domestic ground test complex" was also necessary. Initially, a decision was made to integrate "measurement systems" in the interests of the "Plesetsk Cosmodrome".

It is well known that George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev met on December 2–3, 1989, where Gorbachev signed the Soviet Union’s capitulation in the Cold War.

"I assured the President of the United States that I would never start a war against the USA."

Gorbachev signed documents disclosing the accuracy characteristics of all existing strategic ballistic missiles and committed to reporting each morning on the location of Russia’s Rail-Mobile ICBM System.

However, not everyone was willing to ‘raise their hands in surrender.’ Yuri Semyonovich Solomonov [3], the lead developer of the new mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system, Topol-M, played a key role in the modernization of Russia’s strategic forces. The development, testing, and deployment of the Topol-M system marked a significant step in the advancement of the country's defense capabilities.

As the tests have shown, the Topol-M, in addition to its stealthy mobility, possesses exceptional target accuracy.

The Creation of the "New and Unprecedented"

The primary objective of the developing trajectory data collection system "Collection" is to deliver a comprehensive report on the conducted tests to the President of Russia within 24 hours of the missile launch.

The second phase of the "Collection" system was named the "Unified Control System" (UCS). UCS was designed to work with maneuvering missiles that followed non-traditional trajectories, requiring adaptive real-time retargeting of ground-based measurement system antennas. This included recalibrating the "Vega" tracking system to anticipate and lock onto a precomputed intercept point with the missile. To ensure efficient execution of flight experiments, all measurement systems had to be integrated into a single ground-based tracking complex, including "Vega-NO," "Kama-A," "Kama-N," "Vismutin," "Velour," and others.

The "Collection" system was designed to become (and indeed became) the foundation for managing measurement systems by dynamically retargeting their narrow-beam antennas to adapt to abrupt trajectory changes of the test vehicle. The ground-based measurement complex was envisioned as a unified organism—a single distributed measurement and information system dedicated to testing maneuvering missiles. As a cover story, it was suggested that solid-fuel missiles might exhibit variations in burn rate depending on the condition of the solid propellant, which reacts to different storage conditions. Microcracks in the fuel could alter the combustion surface area, leading to variations in thrust intensity among different "Topol-M" missile units. To compensate for these discrepancies, the missile’s guidance system would generate individual trajectories during the boost phase. This necessity introduced a requirement to seamlessly transfer missile tracking between measurement systems, akin to passing a baton in a relay race. The system had to predict the handover point, generate a retargeting message, and transmit it through cryptographically secured communication lines.

However, all of this inevitably encountered the challenge of integrating the incompatible.

The complexity of this task was determined by several factors:

1) All measurement systems (IS) were developed independently of each other and had different interfaces, codes, measurement frames, varying message lengths, and different types of synchronization.

2) All measurement systems (IS) were distributed across a vast territory, spanning from the western to the eastern borders of Russia.

3) At that time, the choice of operating systems was limited and was primarily supplied through Soviet external intelligence.

4) The tasks of collecting and distributing trajectory data were not automated at any test range, and there was no established methodology for performing such operations.

5) There was no team with experience in solving such tasks.

6) Communication lines were unreliable, and data transmission had to be carried out over cryptographically secured channels.

Missile trajectory measurement systems have different communication parameters. Each manufacturer equipped their system with unique communication parameters and measurement frames based on principles known only to them. This approach was far from ideal and naturally did not allow for simply plugging a cable into a port to transmit data, as there was no guarantee that the receiving end would be ready to support the same parameters by default.

Since the "Collection" system already had an allocated information and reference component in the form of a developed database file server architecture, it was necessary to focus on developing the rest of the "Collection" system. Everything else had to receive data from all measurement systems (IS) independently and in parallel, regardless of the data transmission medium. At the same time, it had to ensure no data loss, maintain real-time operation, encrypt transmitted data, monitor communication lines, and automatically recover in case of synchronization loss or other failures. In short, everything had to function flawlessly, no matter the circumstances. To achieve this, the overarching scientific challenge was broken down into several specific tasks. The first step was to identify and define the constant elements within the mosaic-like flow of information. These stable components would serve as the foundation for designing the software architecture and developing the actual software for the "Collection" system.

As a fundamental constant within the system, a concept already well-known across the USSR in scientific circles was the idea of an Information and Computing Network (ICN). In 1990, a reference book titled "Protocols of Information and Computing Networks (ICN)" was published under the editorial direction of Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences I.A. Mizin and Doctor of Technical Sciences F.P. Kuleshov [4]. Viewing the "Collection" system as an ICN made it possible to define the role of measurement systems (IS) within the functional-logical and physical structure of an ICN. It was evident that the ICN concept had not yet been applied to the ground-based measurement complex of the spaceport at that time. All measurement systems were autonomous. The development of ICN software for the "Collection" system also required identifying a stable foundation within the fragmented knowledge of software development—one that would serve as a consistent reference point for creating the software of the "Collection" system in a logically coherent manner. As this foundation, the "Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model" was chosen. Once OSI was selected as the guiding principle, the next challenge was to extend and adapt its methodologies and algorithms for constructing all levels of software for every element of the ICN at the spaceport.

Dealing with Complexity

The first attempts to develop a trajectory data collection system from tracking measurement systems for strategic ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles across the Soviet Union, based on PDP-11 and VAX-like technology, ended in failure. At NIIRI, efforts were made to use the SM-1420 along with custom-built adapter boards for telephone and telegraph interfaces, but they failed to achieve operational capability due to a mismatch between the hardware development culture and the complexity of the task before 1991. At the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, the center for trajectory data collection, the situation took on a tone of tragicomedy. After the installation of the SM-1700 at the Cosmodrome’s Data Processing Center, military personnel worked with the system for two hours before delivering a harsh verdict: "Not suitable!"

The development team of the "Collection" system, to use a sports analogy, found itself in a severe knockout. Thus ended the first round in the battle to create a unified ground-based measurement complex in the USSR.

The leadership of NIIRI was forced to make numerous personnel changes. Valentin Alekseevich Kozlov, the database architect, was appointed as the new department head. The previous development lead was reassigned as a senior electronic engineer. Kozlov began recruiting volunteers from the CAD and ACS department. Although both insiders and outsiders whispered that their efforts were doomed to fail, the newly formed team was determined to take revenge for their past defeat. Andrii Vadimovich Nikolaiev was appointed as the lead software developer, Yuri Borisovich Voloshin became his deputy as a first-category programmer, and Gennady Valeryevich Aksyuta was put in charge of developing the database file server software.

Nikolaiev Andrii and Voloshin Yuri were both 30 years old at the time. They had studied at Kharkiv Aviation Institute (KhAI) in the Rocket Engineering Faculty, in a program focused on the development of the Kh-55 missile [5]. Both were professionally trained in missile trajectory calculations and had served two years as lieutenants in the Soviet Air Force. Nikolaiev's squadron was recognized as the best in the Soviet Air Force in 1985, while Voloshin served in the regiment of the former "Normandie-Niemen" and visited North Korea as part of a military delegation. Both had experience in martial arts, national time management techniques, and psychological training [6-17]. Nikolaiev personally developed a CAD software suite and, for the first time in NIIRI's history, submitted it to the industry's algorithm and software repository. Additionally, Nikolaiev and Voloshin developed a CAD system for microelectronic hardware, which was also submitted to the repository. This innovation allowed for the first production of photomasks for microtransistors in Kharkiv. In short, neither of them could be intimidated by complex work or high responsibility.

The team was fully assembled at the beginning of 1991. However, the overall atmosphere of the Soviet Union’s collapse loomed in the air. Young specialists finally gained access to computers and immediately installed games on them. Spending countless hours at work playing games became "the norm" at that time. Nikolaiev, responsible for the section handling trajectory data collection and its delivery to the database file server, put an abrupt end to this practice. He publicly erased all games from the "shared personal computers." Kozlov’s reaction was immediate: "You’re going to scare away the entire team that I painstakingly gathered!" Nikolaiev’s response was bold but justified: "A team is not a hobby club where people play games during work hours." From that moment on, those who wanted to work stayed, while those who wanted to play left. The team was purged of its metaphorical "fifth column." This marked the beginning of real work—without any nonsense.

The overall situation at that time was bleak—engineers of the 1980s were humiliated, reduced to roles as farm laborers, loaders, and construction workers. Some were even sweeping the streets in front of the institute. However, the emergence of a new, critical task—one that no one before them had been able to accomplish—became an extraordinary source of motivation for the newly formed team.

Unfortunately, there was no functioning hardware in 1991, so Nikolaiev developed a software emulator to debug the programs under development.

So, it was necessary to rethink the question: "What exactly are we doing?" The problem in developing the "Collection" system lay in its complexity. The information resembled a beautiful mosaic in a child's kaleidoscope toy. This complexity had to be tamed. At that time, I had already read about the method of dealing with complexity in Hubbard’s book "Problems of Work" [18] (although it was not encouraged by the Communist Party of the USSR). This book suggested fixing one key element and then attaching all other parts of the subject area to it, thus forming the complete mosaic.

From the history of aviation technology, the competition between the two helicopter design bureaus, Kamov and Mil, in developing a heavy transport helicopter was well known. Mil and Kamov took different approaches: Kamov attempted to create a complex helicopter, while Mil transferred all the complexity into a single component—the main rotor blade. In practice, it proved easier to develop a complex component rather than an entirely complex machine. As a result, the Ka-22 project was canceled, while the Mi-6 was mass-produced and filled the skies of the Motherland [19, 20, 21].

The first task in developing the Information Computing Network (ICN) of the "Collection" system was simplification. The traditional physical structure of the ICN is shown in the diagram:

In the development of the "Collection" system, it was necessary to implement a transformation that would simplify the complexity of both the logical and physical structures of the ICN by:

1) replacing all ICN elements with a single universal element — the Information Concentrator;

2) replacing the terminal, which the ICN is oriented towards, with a measurement system; in other words, replacing an alphanumeric terminal like the EC 7927 with a measurement system.

3) replacing the mainframe computers with ARMs (Automated Workstations).

Modified physical structure of the Information and Computing Network (ICN) of the Unified Ground Measurement Complex (UGMC). IS – Measurement System; IC – Information Concentrator; AWP – Automated Workstation for a Specialist.

Now it was possible to specify the architecture of the hardware and software components of the *Collection* system. The traditional hardware architecture scheme used in computing technology at that time consisted of a central processor, a data transmission multiplexer (communication processor), and terminals.

The specification of the Information Concentrator (IC) prototype led to the following scheme:

To ensure the parallelism of information flows circulating within the Information Processing System of "Collection," the UNIX operating system was selected. Therefore, the software architecture of the Information Concentrator (IC) can be described by the following scheme:

Now let's take a closer look at the interface processor, also known as the NI-526 device.

The structural diagram of this dual-processor computing system is presented in the following schematic.

The interfacing device consists of:

• n computer interface units via the C2 interface (1)
• two computing units (2)
• n input-output units (3)
• a shared RAM for both computing units (4)
• two central processing units (CPUs) (5)
• two dedicated RAM modules, each accessible only by its respective CPU (6)
• two dedicated ROM modules, each accessible only by its respective CPU (7)

The interfacing device is connected via cables through its computer interface units using the C2 interface (1) to a serial port expansion device with an RS-232 interface (commonly known as the COM port for personal computers).

As a personal computer (PC) running the UNIX operating system, the IBM 386SX was selected.

Thus, the external design of the Information Concentrator (NI-525) was defined, allowing the renewed team to establish the external design of the universal element of the "Collection" system—the Information Concentrator.

Next, it was necessary to modify the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model to fit the Unified Ground-Based Measurement Complex and develop the corresponding software.

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